This review has been accessed  times since Jan. 25, 2001
Nussbaum, Martha. (2000). Women and human development:
The capabilities approach. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Pp. xxi + 312.
$24.95
ISBN 0-521-66086-6
Reviewed by John Ambrosio, University of Washington
January 25, 2001
In Women
and Human Development, Martha Nussbaum attempts to
shift the theoretical terrain on which international
development policy is currently situated. In doing so, she
constructs a universalist feminist philosophy based on
central human capabilities that, if met, would provide the
minimum threshold necessary for the development of all
people—although her specific focus is on the situation of
poor women in India. In place of cultural relativism and
aggregated conceptions of the good put forward by
utilitarian economics, Nussbaum proposes a set of
interrelated and indivisible capabilities, conceived as
human rights, that offer moral guidance for the development
of political principles that can be translated into
constitutional guarantees. The capabilities provide
individuals with opportunities for functioning, for making
self-defined choices possible. These choices, however, are
virtually meaningless without the material preconditions
that enable their functioning. Thus, the central question
driving the capabilities approach is: What are individuals
actually able to do or to be?
Nussbaum's
primary objective is to place these spheres of choice
"beyond the whim of majoritarian politics" by
translating them into constitutional guarantees. For her,
the political goal of justice, of meeting the threshold for
each capability, supersedes liberty--outweighing and
morally constraining choices that conflict with the central
principle of political liberalism: "do no harm to
others." Ensuring equal access to the central
capabilities, she argues, should "constrain all
economic choices" (p. 33). Individual and collective
choices that result in differential access to the
capabilities, she argues, ineluctably violate this
governing principle.
Given
existing social inequities and asymmetrical relations of
power, the capabilities approach requires "spending
unequal amounts of money on the disadvantaged" in
order to bring every person up to the "same level of
capability to function" (p. 99). Thus, universalizing
opportunities for full human functioning would require
redistributive policies, although the absolute level of
resources devoted to establishing functional capabilities
would differ according to the specificity of material
conditions. Because the exercise of certain types of
functioning in childhood are an essential precondition to
developing "a mature adult capability," Nussbaum
argues that the state has a compelling interest in
"any treatment of children that has a long-term impact
on these capabilities" (p. 90). Thus, it is
imperative that children be given genuine opportunities to
exercise capabilities that are vital to their functioning
as future citizens.
In addition
to material prerequisites, actual functioning depends on an
internal process of self-definition, of developing a
conception of self as a "bearer of rights and a
citizen whose dignity and worth are equal to that of
others" (p. 13). The practical value of Nussbaum's
theorizing lies in providing poor women with a
"framework in which to view what is happening to them
and a set of concepts with which to criticize abuses that
otherwise might have lurked nameless in the background of
life" (p. 36). By naming the nameless, and providing
women with a conceptual framework to identify and criticize
abuses, Nussbaum hopes to foster a sense of entitlement and
to strengthen the moral authority necessary to resist
social norms that constrict or deny opportunities for
"truly human functioning." Nussbaum's approach
is not prescriptive, women may legitimately choose to live
in accordance with traditional beliefs and values, but it
must be a choice rather than a social compulsion. In this
way, individuals who possess strong convictions about
particular conceptions of the good could support the
capabilities approach without having to significantly alter
their beliefs. Nussbaum is not interested in criticizing
the central tenets of particular belief systems, but in
opening up possibilities for choosing differently.
Creating the possibility of making certain choices does not
require that they be chosen.
Choice is
problematic, she argues, because of the many ways it is
shaped and deformed by "habit, fear, low expectations,
and unjust background conditions" (p. 114). To what
degree can individuals make authentic choices if their
psychic needs and desires are ineluctably formed within the
social and historical specificity of certain normative
contexts? In effect, Nussbaum argues that some choices are
better than others, that the specific conditions in which
choices are made influence the possibility of choosing
authentically. That is, she insists that informed choices,
those based on critical reflection and deliberate
intentionality, are more likely to reflect the real
interests and desires of individuals than choices made
under desperate or constraining circumstances. Thus, the
political rights of self-determination and affiliation
embodied in the central capabilities are vital to the
formulation of genuine human needs, of creating
opportunities to make functional choices.
The
capabilities approach was developed by Nussbaum during
eight month-long residencies as research advisor at the
World Institute for Development Economics Research, an
institute of the United Nations University. The concept of
functional capabilities is based on the pioneering work of
Amartya Sen in development economics, although Nussbaum
goes beyond comparative notions of capability equality by
insisting on a threshold level of capability that can
"provide a basis for central constitutional principles
that citizens have a right to demand from their
governments" (p. 12).
Nussbaum's
list of ten central capabilities, which are tentative and
open to revision, reflect her awareness of the
"specific details and dynamics" of poverty in
India—a situation that led to her to place greater
emphasis on issues such as bodily integrity, control over
one's political and material environment, and human
dignity. The list also reflects Nussbaum's belief that the
problems of poor women in the developed and developing
world should take center stage among the concerns of
middle-class women. In addition to ensuring the basic
capabilities of life and bodily health, she is concerned
with internal capabilities, such as the ability to
"imagine, think, and reason," to develop and
sustain emotional bonds, to formulate conceptions of the
good through critical reflection, and to affiliate with and
show compassion for others. Truly human functioning, she
argues, also means being able to "laugh, play, and
enjoy recreational activities," as well as the ability
to "live with concern for and in relation to animals,
plants, and the world of nature" (pp. 78-80). The
capabilities serve as a kind of moral umbrella designed to
accommodate cultural variation while establishing cross-
cultural thresholds of human capability.
Among the many social forces that compel affiliation and
influence adaptive preferences, however, is the free
market--and the values it promotes. Curiously, Nussbaum
does not directly address the enormous power of the global
market to frame individual choices and drive human desires
and preferences. Instead, she elides the topic, hoping
that the moral claims embodied in the capabilities list
will somehow "steer the process of globalization"
(p. 105). Given the enormous influence of neoliberal
schemes of privatization and structural adjustment, and the
extension of capitalist social relations to every corner of
the globe, it is not clear why Nussbaum believes corporate
and political leaders might follow her moral guidance.
Although
culture plays a dominant role in socio-emotional
development, Nussbaum argues, individuals possess an innate
capacity for autonomous choice that is to "some extent
independent of culture" (p. 155). Despite this claim,
she places little trust in unexamined desire, preferring to
rely on substantive rather than procedural goals and values
to provide a normative basis for a "partial theory of
justice," one that is contextual and contingent given
differing social and material conditions. The very idea
that "crucial choices would be made about who gets to
have milk in tea and who only sugar," she argues, is
more difficult for Western philosophers to comprehend than
"the big facts of location and political organization
and religion" (p. 23).
Nussbaum introduces the principle of moral constraint, or
"anything that results in cruel or unjust
treatment," to set the boundaries of permissible
choice. Choices that result in differential treatment
concerning access to the central capabilities are by
definition outside the boundaries of what can reasonably be
chosen. Thus, discriminatory or repressive choices that
constrict or deny equal access to the central capabilities
violate the principle of moral constraint.
The paradox
in her conception of authentic choice, however, is that the
formation of informed desire is itself a precondition for
the kinds of functionality made possible by the central
capabilities. Thus, how can informed desire, which is
essential to making genuine choices, develop prior to
establishing the political rights and social conditions
that make its formation possible? Although Nussbaum does
not state so explicitly, the capabilities approach can only
be implemented through a dialectical process of historical
change in which thrusts from below and pressures from above
move together toward a synthesis.
Nussbaum's
central aim is to develop "cross-cultural norms of
justice, equality and rights" that make international
quality of life comparisons possible while remaining
sensitive to local particularities (p. 7). She grounds her
work in the concrete realities and substantive issues
facing poor working women in India, using the specificity
of two women's lives as dialectical reference points in
constructing and justifying her theoretical positions. In
doing so, Nussbaum constructs an unusual philosophical
argument infused with the voices, and informed by the life
experiences, of the women for whom she is theorizing.
Intent on making her philosophy "responsive to
reality," Nussbaum's analytical arguments continually
reach out to the reality of everyday social life for
relevance and meaning, all the while maintaining a firm
commitment to developing universal standards of human
capability.
Nussbaum's
conception of functional human capabilities challenges the
dominant discourse of resource allocation within
international development economics. Rather than focusing
on the amount of resources individuals are able to command,
Nussbaum is concerned with what "each and every"
person is "actually able to do or be" with the
resources available to them. In effect, she wants to
disaggregate the central concepts and analytical categories
of international development theory, unpacking and
replacing them with ones that reflect the particularity of
individual choices, desires, and local conditions. For
similar reasons, Nussbaum rejects John Rawls' (1971)
primary goods approach to distributive justice because it
neglects the "varying needs of individuals for
resources and their ability to convert resources into
valuable human functioning" (p. 68). That is, the
concept of primary goods fails to take into account the
ability of each person to translate available resources
into functional choices.
Like
international development policy, the debate about public
school reform has become situated within the conceptual and
moral boundaries of utilitarian economics. Thus, applying
the capabilities approach to the issue of educational
reform would require a parallel shift in the rhetorical
terrain of discussion, and a redirection of national
priorities away from the neoliberal gospel of cost-benefit
analysis to a conception of education based on developing
each and every person's capacity for "truly human
functioning." Changing the discursive frame of
reference would mean reformulating how educational issues
are problematized, and redefining the parameters of
legitimate and reasonable public discussion about
education.
The
"glorious totals and averages" such as GDP per
capita that serve as normative economic measures find their
educational analog in norm-referenced standardized tests
and other aggregated assessments of student achievement.
When applied to schooling, the capabilities approach is not
concerned with how particular schools, districts, or states
perform, but how each student is doing relative to where
they began. That is, the capabilities approach asks a
different question: What is each student able to do or to
be given the actual choices and resources available to
them?
Standards-based
school reform and high-stakes testing violate
Nussbaum's principle of undifferentiated access to the
central capabilities by imposing normative standards of
achievement in the absence of normative standards of actual
functioning. In passing Clinton's Goals 2000
education plan, the U.S. Congress rejected the inclusion of
"opportunity to learn standards" that would have
required every state to provide students with sufficient
resources to meet the new state-developed standards. The
standards-based school reform efforts spawned by Goals
2000 and a series of national education summits violate
the principle of undifferentiated access by requiring all
students, despite their relative privilege or disadvantage,
to meet the same academic requirements.
The more
crucial a specific functioning is to attaining other
central capabilities, Nussbaum argues, the more governments
are entitled "to promote or require actual functioning
over the opportunity to function" (p. 92). Given the
centrality of education to the capabilities, Nussbaum calls
for compulsory primary and secondary education for all
children, fully aware that education is a contested site
that has the potential to reproduce ideologies based on
hierarchy and prejudice or provide students with
opportunities to transcend socially constructed knowledge
and identities. Governments can also require a degree of
functioning necessary to ensure the current and future
availability of certain choices that may not be supported
by a majority of citizens.
While accountability is necessary to ensure actual
functioning, high-stakes testing does not serve this
purpose, and in fact, leaves the state unaccountable in
terms of providing standards that give every student the
same functional opportunities. Authentic accountability is
closely linked to what actually goes on in classrooms and
is sensitive to diversity in school populations. The issue
is not whether schools should be accountable, but how
accountability is determined. That is, whether schools
should engage in hit-and-run testing or use multiple forms
evidence in ongoing assessments that evaluate a range of
intelligences and cognitive skills, and what students can
reasonably be held accountable for given widely differing
educational needs and access to resources. While
governments have a legitimate interest in ensuring
accountability, they should not possess sole authority to
determine standards for actual functioning. Educational
authority for making such decisions must be shared with
those who have the greatest stake in the personal
development and academic success of students: parents,
teachers and other school staff, and district
personnel.
Taking the
capabilities approach seriously would require major changes
within and outside of education. Although guarantees of
equal treatment in state constitutions have provided the
basis for legal efforts challenging long-standing
inequities, they have proved inadequate in ensuring every
student access to the same functional choices. In addition
to increased state and federal spending on education,
undifferentiated access to the central capabilities would
require a significant expansion of the national welfare
state. This would mean not only guaranteeing access to
basic human necessities such as housing, food, and health
care, but creating new entitlements such as quality day
care, child support, and paid parental leave and vacation
time, that enable parents to adequately care for and
nurture their children.
What
would public education in the U.S. look like if we took
Nussbaum's capabilities approach seriously? That is, if
society were able to marshal the will to translate them
into political goals and constitutional guarantees? If the
principle of treating each and every person as an end
became a moral and legislative mandate, schooling would
change dramatically because education would no longer be
about meeting external social, economic, or political
demands. Assembly-line schooling would be abandoned and
replaced by a conception of education driven by the
interests, needs, and culturally relevant learning styles
of individual students. Schools would necessarily be small
personalized communities in which affiliation and
reciprocity would serve as operative moral and
organizational principles. Developing the capability of
practical reason, or the critical reflection necessary to
plan one's life, means accepting and valuing the many ways
in which students know, learn, and construct their own
conceptions of the good.
At the
present time in India, she argues, "the single most
effective way for government to promote women's sense of
their worth and their entitlements is to promote women's
collectives" (p. 289). Nussbaum views women's
collectives as the primary locus of social transformation
in India while she simultaneously privileges the
establishment of constitutional guarantees linked to the
central capabilities, some of which are already contained
in the Indian constitution, but remain unenforced. This
tension reflects the inherent contradictions in Nussbaum's
project. That is, as with the case of informed desire, the
political rights embodied in the capabilities are, in
important ways, a precondition to developing the new
"regimes of choice" exemplified by the women's
collectives. At the same time, further development of
voluntary affiliative associations like women's collectives
are vital to creating the social and political pressure
necessary to establish constitutional guarantees that
protect and extend new spheres of choice.
Nussbaum's
project sharply diverges from the neoliberal ideology and
market values that currently dominate public discussion of
educational reform in the U.S. The group solidarity and
non-hierarchical communities of care Nussbaum found so
important in strengthening women's sense of power, self-
worth, and identity are applicable to schooling, internal
capabilities that are being systematically undermined by
the imposition of high-stakes tests that diminish hopes and
lower expectations for the majority of students across the
U.S. who have not been guaranteed the opportunity to meet
them. Public education remains a vigorously contested and
contradictory site, one that may yet provide opportunities
to begin shifting the national debate in the direction
shown by the capabilities approach.
Reference
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
About the Reviewer
John Ambrosio is a Ph.D. student in the Program in
Curriculum and Instruction at the University of Washington,
Seattle. His main areas of interest are multicultural
education, philosophy of education, epistemology, and
educational reform.
This review was produced under the special editorship of David Blacker.
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