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
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Peace Education has a young, albeit robust, scholarly life; and there is little question that peace education is of concern to teachers, scholars, and politicians. The United Nations Declaration of Human rights articulates peace education as a means of fulfilling the United Nations Charter responsibilities, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) takes it as a central task to educate towards peace, naming 2000 the International Year for the Culture of Peace and 2001-2010 the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for Children of the World. Curricula vary from rules and guidelines of mediation and conflict resolution, to social-emotional learning programs that develop empathy and perspective taking, to crisis



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intervention and management, and to international understanding. More broadly, peace education has found its way into human rights education, social justice education and critical pedagogy, and environmental education (Global Network of Educators). UNESCO even rolls up education for peace, human rights, and democracy all into one aim (UNESCO, 1995, p.9). What is surprisingly absent in peace education scholarship, James Page tells us in *Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations*, is an explicit, rigorous argument on philosophical and ethical grounds for why we ought to have peace education in the first place; certainly there are philosophical assumptions about the nature of human beings implicit in anyone who educates for peace -- that we are capable of lasting peace and without education we would not achieve it, for example -- but on what philosophical grounds these assumptions are made is seldom clear.

Page aims to fill the gap in scholarship by "investigat[ing] and enunciat[ing] ethico-philosophical foundations for peace education" (p. 18). To this end, rather than making a singular philosophical argument for peace education, Page explores how five forms of ethics can inform peace education: virtue ethics, consequentialist ethics, conservative political ethics, aesthetic ethics, and ethics of care. The first chapter of his book discusses the current status of peace education regarding scholarship and societal institutions; problems defining peace and the relation between peace education; peace research, and peace advocacy; and he articulates his concern regarding the scarcity of philosophical work in peace education. The rest of the book is dedicated to interpreting philosophical works with the question, What would it mean to justify peace education from any given ethico-philosophical tradition? Thus, this review will focus primarily on Page's engagement with philosophical works and the connections he draws to peace education.

Page is justified in criticizing the relative dearth of philosophical foundational work in peace education. His undertaking as a response to these concerns is a commendable one. He selects ethical philosophies that are

appropriate for addressing his critique, and Page clearly demonstrates his familiarity with all the key figures in the ethical traditions he cites. However, in trying to mention them all, he has little space to provide substantive enough discussion about how each ethical tradition can serve as a justification for peace education. This forces Page to make quick philosophical assertions without making clear to the reader his reasoning behind them. Moreover, the work reads as though Page is not seeking to explore what these philosophical traditions have to say about peace education, but instead to start with the assumption that peace education is justifiable by these traditions and then to reason back to these traditions in order to confirm his assumption. As such, I worry Page has the answer to his question prior to engaging with the texts. To explain how and why this concerns me, I will point to two examples that are representative: Page's discussion of 1) Aristotle's conceptualization of *eudaimonia* (human flourishing) and its relation to peace education, and 2) Heidegger as a forerunner of care ethics.

In describing how virtue ethics might serve as a foundation for peace education, Page states that because the Aristotelian moral virtues that lead us to human flourishing involve feeling, choosing, and acting well, and because the United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace indicates that a culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, traditions, and modes of behavior and ways of life, then "it is difficult to interpret the notion of human flourishing as anything other than a culture of peace" (p. 30). Yet this is not quite right. It would have been more appropriate to say that the UN's idea of a culture of peace seems to be one that can be developed from the perspective of virtue ethics. To say that Aristotle's concept of human flourishing *is* a vision of a culture of peace is too large a leap. The fact that these two ideas, human flourishing and culture of peace, utilize similar concepts to articulate themselves does not mean that those concepts are employed in exactly the same way nor that the two are identical to each other. A culture of war might also have a set of values, attitudes, traditions, and modes of behavior that constitute its vision of human flourishing. If a culture of war has a

vision of human flourishing and a culture of peace has a vision of human flourishing, how then can human flourishing itself be identical to one vision or the other?

Page does seem to acknowledge this problem with appropriating Aristotle's *eudaimonia* as a culture of peace when he says the virtue of courage is difficult to deal with considering it is generally considered a military virtue. To deal with this difficulty, Page says that we can just render courage differently—as assertiveness being the mean between aggression and passivity. This is a rendering of courage to which I would certainly be sympathetic, and I have recently argued a similar point (Mulryan 2010). In the paragraph where Page makes this argument, however, he does not account for important aspects of Aristotle's understanding of courage. For example, Aristotle says courage is the ability to face the fear of death (Aristotle 2002, p. 132-133 [1115a10-b5]; Aristotle 1984a, p. 1983 [1250b1, 1251a10-15]). Moreover, it is not just any death one fears in being courageous (2002, p. 134 [1116a10]), but it is death in war that is the greatest and finest (p. 133 [1115a25-30]), thus making the warrior *a*, if the not *the*, exemplar of courage. More than just the problem with doing justice to Aristotle's understanding, if we merely rename courage as assertiveness, what, then is the difference between courage and assertiveness—why maintain two different words for the exact same concept?

To be fair, Page does work to justify this rendering of courage as compatible with an Aristotelian understanding of *eudaimonia* by claiming that violence is not morally justifiable to Aristotle, because there is no virtue of violence as such within the teachings of Aristotle (Page, p. 32). As far as analytic definitions of Aristotelian virtues, Page is correct in saying that violence is not a virtue. However, Page's assertion is complicated when we consider Aristotle's claim that:

Human beings, too, then, are distressed when angry, and take pleasure in retaliating [which is translated as "exact[ing] revenge" in Aristotle 1984b]; but people who fight from these motives

are effective in fighting, not courageous, *since they do not fight because of the fine, or as the correct prescription directs*, but because of affection (2002, p. 136 [1117a5], emphasis added).

This suggests that one can be courageous if one fights because of the fine or as the correct prescription directs (and given the importance of death in war to describing courage I take what Aristotle means by "fighting" to include violent fighting).

Finally, Page points to 3:9 of the *Nichomachean Ethics* claiming Aristotle hints that courage "ought not be properly considered a military virtue" (Page, p. 32). I strongly disagree. Although it is true, as Page claims, that Aristotle says that those who make the best soldiers might be those with little to lose, and that these are not necessarily the most courageous, Aristotle does say just prior to that that what makes a person perhaps more courageous is that he has more to lose and "chooses what is fine in war in place of those other goods" (p. 137 [1117b10]). That is, Aristotle does say that the most effective soldier *might* not be the most courageous, but this does not mean he says or implies, against his earlier thinking, that the most courageous person is *not* a soldier, nor that courage is not necessary for the soldier. He merely argues that a soldier's effectiveness is not necessarily dependent on the magnitude of his courage. The only chance of releasing courage from its bond to war is in Aristotle's claim in the *Eudemian Ethics* that military courage is one of five types (Aristotle 1984c, p. 1947 [1229a10-15]), and shortly after states that "true bravery is neither [civic courage] nor any of the others, but like them..." (Aristotle 1984c, p. 1948 [1230a20-25]). Yet this would require even further unpacking and Page would need to contend with the fact that the *Eudemian Ethics* is generally considered an earlier and less mature expression of Aristotle's ethical philosophy than the *Nichomachean Ethics*.

If we take all of this in consideration with Aristotle's claim in the *Nichomachean Ethics* that that fearing death in war is the greatest and finest, then war violence seems clearly compatible with Aristotle's virtues, and we cannot say that

Aristotle's concept of *eudaimonia* is without question a culture of peace.

My second representative disagreement with Page also stems from the quick pacing of his work and from the aims of justifying peace education from a particular ethico-philosophical tradition overpowering what a particular text is trying to say. Page discusses Heidegger's employment of the term *Sorge*, often translated as *care*, in order to discuss Heidegger under the theme of care ethics. My concern is that his understanding of Heidegger's use of the word *Sorge* seems to go against the consensus of the meaning of this word as understood by Heidegger scholars. For example, Page states that the following major themes in *Being and Time* underpin an ethics of care: how ontology/being is found in engagement in the world, how care (*Sorge*) is the reality of being, and how care and being are manifest through temporality (Page, p. 170).

The first claim is not clear to me, but more importantly Heidegger's term *Sorge* does not carry the same connotation as we might think of *care* in everyday English; and this is not merely a problem of simple translation of common usages across languages. First, to Heidegger, *care* is not a psychological phenomenon (Dreyfus 1991, p. 238). Moreover, when Hubert Dreyfus told Heidegger in conversation that *care* in English has connotations of love and caring, Heidegger responded that "that was unfortunate since with the term 'care' [Heidegger] wanted to name the general fact that '*Sein geht mich an*,' roughly, that being gets to me" (p. 239). William Blattner (2006) further explains that to Heidegger *care* is the fundamental structure of being, and the technical term merely designates that we are concerned about our own being -- who and what we are as humans -- not that we necessarily care about others in a loving or empathetic way (p. 37). In fact, Blattner tells us that *care* "characterizes a carefree or detached person as much as one committed to service of others" (Ibid.). As such, caring about others in the ordinary sense, and in a sense that a culture of peace might advocate, is only possible (not necessary), because of the "formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole" designated as *care*

(Heidegger 1962, p. 237). Finally, *care*, as employed by Heidegger, suffuses everything we do, including hate, loathe, destroy, and violate. Surprisingly, though, Page never mentions Heidegger's term "solicitude" (*Fürsorge*), as this is Heidegger's technical term for how others matter to us; yet nonetheless, like with *Sorge*, this mattering-to-us means nothing in terms of any ethical commitment.

Heidegger's "care" (either understood from *Sorge* or *Fürsorge*) has little to do with the common understanding of *care* in care ethics, and it is no surprise that Levinas, whom Page more plausibly also cites as foundational to care ethics because of Levinas's "priority of relationship over being," said of his own philosophical approach, "...we will not find the relation with the existent respected in its being...on...the *care* and *doing* characteristic of the Heideggerian *Dasein*" (Levinas 1969, p.109, emphasis original).

On a related note, Page wants to connect Heidegger and Levinas to care ethics because the "relational nature of ontology is an important aspect of care ethics" (Page, p. 170). Yet what "otherness" designates as a technical term in Heidegger is very different than what it designates as such in Levinas, primarily because their philosophies start in fundamentally different places from each other. In light of all of the above, I was surprised to see Page trace care ethics from Heidegger to Levinas on the grounds each employs the term "otherness" as central in each of their philosophies.

Thus, I think calling Heidegger most clearly the forerunner of care ethics is misguided and the connection Page makes between Heidegger and Levinas tenuous. Certainly, Page does not have to agree with these interpretations on authority alone; however it would be helpful if he were to explain why he thinks of a technical philosophical term differently than general scholarly consensus.

To summarize, I agree with Page that scholarship in peace education largely lacks adequate philosophical foundations with which to justify itself. I also agree with Page's selection of ethical traditions from which to start thinking about

grounding peace education in philosophical ethics. However, the pace at which Page requires his writing to proceed given the scope of his task lends to quick interpretations without clearly showing substantive reasoning as to why that interpretation might be correct. I thus have strong reservations about this book as a substantive or authoritative enunciation of the ethico-philosophical foundations for peace education -- not because of Page's originating critique or the selection of sources he uses, but for too many questions about his interpretations that were raised as I was reading his philosophical analysis. Page leaves too much work for the reader, darting off in directions the purpose of which is unclear and using technical philosophical terms without introducing them to the reader, and I spent most of my time trying to retrace Page's steps in order to understand why he was discussing a particular point and to see the connections he claimed but never fully explained were there. I also think there is a problem with method, exemplified in his discussion of *eudaimonia* and peace education and of Heidegger's employment of the term "care". Although Page has an impressive intuition about the importance of certain philosophical works for peace education, I worry his eagerness to find connections unduly distorts his readings of those works and leads him to make tenuous connections between those works and peace education. Thus, although Page is right to undertake this task, and I agree with the premise of his book, he ultimately falls short of adequately investigating the philosophical foundations of peace education.

However, these criticisms about his investigation should not be taken as an outright dismissal of the contributions Page makes to his field. Certainly, as an explorer in the philosophical foundations of peace education, Page has rather comprehensively sketched out a map of germane philosophical traditions of ethics presented for those who might adventure to further flesh out the philosophical foundations of peace education.

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